

24 MARCH 1947

I N D E X  
of  
WITNESSES

Defense' Witnesses

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KATAKURA, Tadashi (resumed)

18956

Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)

18965

MORNING RECESS

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Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)

18980

NOON RECESS

18998

Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)

18999

AFTERNOON RECESS

19026

Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)

19027

1 Monday, 24 March 1947

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3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before with the  
14 exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE JARANILLA, Member  
15 from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, not  
16 sitting.

17 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

18 For the Defense Section, same as before.

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20 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
21 to English interpretation was made by the  
22 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except OKAWA and MATSUI. We have a certificate from  
5 the Sugamo Prison doctor that MATSUI is too ill to  
6 attend the Trial today. The certificate will be recorded  
7 and filed. Both accused are represented by counsel.

8 - - -

9 T A D A S H I K A T A K U R A, called as a  
10 witness on behalf of the defense, resumed  
11 the stand and testified through Japanese  
12 interpreters as follows:

13 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney

14 MR. BLAKENEY: On behalf of the defense I wish  
15 to make application to the Tribunal for the granting  
16 of a recess of one week's duration to enable the defense  
17 to organize and prepare its case. The reasons which  
18 render the making and granting of this application a  
19 matter of extreme urgency to the defense were fully  
20 stated in the hearing in chambers on Thursday last.

21 Since I assume that all Members of the Tribunal  
22 have made themselves conversant with the record of that  
23 proceeding I shall not restate those reasons here, but  
24 shall content myself with saying that the urgency is as  
25 great and the reasons are as valid today as they were at

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1 that time.

2 THE PRESIDENT: How much longer can you carry  
3 on without a recess, Major Blakeney? We receive this  
4 application with profound regret and with great appre-  
5 hension.

6 MR. BLAKENEY: I am advised by those in control  
7 of the matters presently being presented that they can  
8 perhaps continue to the end of this week by the calling  
9 of witnesses out of their proper turn. Otherwise,  
10 they are prepared to continue until the conclusion of  
11 the testimony of the witness now in the box.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Will the witnesses called out  
13 of turn produce affidavits?

14 MR. BLAKENEY: Preparation has not yet been  
15 made to adduce their testimony in that fashion.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Suppose you get a recess of  
17 seven days, how long will you be able to continue without  
18 asking for further time?

19 MR. BLAKENEY: I am afraid I should not care  
20 to commit myself on that, sir. We anticipate that we  
21 could probably then proceed to June without difficulty,  
22 but I do not wish to be understood as making any commit-  
23 ment whatsoever in a matter so speculative and contingent  
24 as that.

25 THE PRESIDENT: That would be something if you



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could continue to June.

1 MR. BLAKENEY: Such is our hope.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I have no doubt you are  
3 cooperating to the fullest extent with the Court. I  
4 do not doubt that for one moment. The Court will be  
5 prepared to meet you in every reasonable way, of course,  
6 on that understanding, that you will give us your  
7 fullest cooperation which I do not question.

8 Will the prosecution like to say anything about  
9 this?

10 Mr. Tavenner.

11 MR. TAVENNER: Your Honor, in view of statements  
12 made in chambers comparing the position of the defense  
13 with that of the prosecution, I think I should make  
14 just one or two statements.

15 THE PRESIDENT: If you are not prepared to make  
16 a statement now, Mr. Tavenner, we will hear it later.  
17 This decision will be reserved, of course.

18 MR. TAVENNER: I am prepared to state now  
19 all that I have to say on the subject.

20 Reference was made to a charge that the prosecu-  
21 tion had quite a backlog of documents processed at the  
22 time that their case began. That is not in keeping with  
23 the facts. We were ahead of the time for presentation  
24 of documents by just one or two days. The translation  
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1 and the processing of all of the prosecution documents  
2 had to be done during the course of the presentation  
3 of the evidence. The Manchurian Phase of the prosecu-  
4 tion's case was completed in August. It is hard for us  
5 to understand why documents have not been processed  
6 for the defense covering that phase of the case which was  
7 completed by the prosecution in August.

8 THE PRESIDENT: When did the defense first get  
9 the facilities for processing documents? Had they  
10 to wait until you finished, that is, until you closed  
11 your case?

12 MR. TAVENNER: I am not certain how soon they  
13 had facilities of their own, but they were offered the  
14 prosecution's facilities in the latter part of January  
15 or possibly a little earlier. At times when we were  
16 not so busy we suggested that they let the documents  
17 come to us so that we could assist speedily. We have  
18 not turned down the request for either the translation  
19 or the processing of a single document.  
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Of course there are nearly  
2 fifty defense counsel to agree upon what documents  
3 would be used.

4 MR. TAVENNER: I think there are over a  
5 hundred defense counsel. I think with the assis-  
6 tance of so many counsel they should have been  
7 able to have agreed since August.

8 THE PRESIDENT: You think the greater the  
9 number of counsel the better chance there is of  
10 speedy agreement? It may suggest conflicting  
11 interest. I don't know about these conflicting  
12 interests, but they say they are there.

13 MR. TAVENNER: I speak from experience  
14 when I say that with a sufficiently large number  
15 of counsel they should be able to get the work  
16 done.

17 THE PRESIDENT: If there is agreement on  
18 the documents.

19 MR. TAVENNER: If they have not been able  
20 to agree since August, what assurance is there that  
21 they will ever agree? I am certain that we all,  
22 the Tribunal, the defense counsel, and the prosecu-  
23 tion view with alarm the matter of the length of  
24 the trial and the time consumed in the presentation  
25 of the case.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Most of the time so far  
2 has been consumed by the prosecution.

3 MR. TAVENNER: I will be very glad to give  
4 your Honor some figures on that.

5 THE PRESIDENT: I should like to have them.

6 MR. TAVENNER: The two phases of the prose-  
7 cution's case, one dealing with constitution and  
8 laws, and the other with preparation of public  
9 opinion for war, corresponds, roughly, to the  
10 first division of the defense's case. The time con-  
11 sumed by the prosecution in the presentation of those  
12 two phases, including matters that they were respon-  
13 sible for originating in the way of making arguments,  
14 was twenty-one hours and seventeen minutes, while  
15 that of the defense was thirty-one hours and eight  
16 minutes, a total of fifty-two hours and twenty-five  
17 minutes.

18  
19 In this first general division of the  
20 defense phase the defense took forty-eight hours and  
21 forty-three minutes to present their part of it,  
22 and the time consumed by the prosecution in cross-  
23 examination and making objections and the argument  
24 of those objections was twenty-two hours and thirty-  
25 two minutes, a total of seventy-one hours and fifteen  
minutes; and we are advised that there are about

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1 five witnesses yet to be heard -- at least they were  
2 on the order list -- and there are numerous docu-  
3 ments yet to be presented. On the basis of the  
4 time actually consumed by both the prosecution and  
5 the defense in these phases, the defense has con-  
6 sumed thirty-four per cent more time than was used  
7 in the prosecution's original phase of the case.  
8 The percentage of increase of time consumed by the  
9 defense in its phase over the time consumed by  
10 the prosecution in its phase is one hundred twenty-  
11 eight per cent, based on the figures I gave.

12 Now, we think this is an alarming situation  
13 and we want to object, of course, to any procedure  
14 that will further delay matters. If there is a  
15 break down, as a matter of fact, in the presentation,  
16 possibly there is nothing to do other than to grant  
17 a reasonable continuance. We thought we should take  
18 this opportunity to express our alarm at the situa-  
19 tion.

20 THE PRESIDENT: That we should go on until  
21 there is a break down? Will that improve the situa-  
22 tion? We must pursue the best course. Is that it?

23 MR. TAVENNER: I am not prepared to say  
24 that it is. If it is the intention of the defense  
25 to put on witnesses merely to see how long they can



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1 stay on the witness stand without having their work  
2 organized, we are losing time instead of saving it  
3 unless during that period of time they can catch  
4 up on their other work so that the case will con-  
5 tinue without any adjournment.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We desire to avoid poor,  
7 faulty, weak examinations of witnesses taken out of  
8 order. Are you opposing the application, Mr.  
9 Tavenner?

10 MR. TAVENNER: No, sir. If there is a break  
11 down we feel we cannot oppose a reasonable time to  
12 get organized.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Do you challenge anything  
14 the defense had to say about the possibility of a  
15 break down this week if we do not give the recess?  
16

17 MR. TAVENNER: No, sir, I do not.

18 THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider  
19 the matter.

20 Mr. OKAMOTO  
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1 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Since the answer given on  
2 Friday afternoon wasn't clear to me, I would like  
3 to have the court reporter repeat the question --  
4 last answer.

5 THE MONITOR: The Japanese court reporter.

6 (Whereupon, the last answer was read  
7 by the Japanese court reporter.)

8 English court reporter, will you kindly  
9 read the corresponding parts in English, please.

10 (Whereupon, the last answer was read  
11 by the official court reporter.)

12 Correction on the last part: That a new  
13 state should be created on the principle of no  
14 soldiery and on the principle of not to menace  
15 and not to be menaced, and thereby found a state  
16 based upon the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.  
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## DIRECT EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

2 Q Will you please explain, amplify, the present  
3 statement concerning the state based upon the Monroe  
4 Doctrine?

5 A In the opinion of Yu Chun-han, so long as a  
6 state founded upon the Kingly Way was to be established  
7 in the northeastern area, a state somewhat like  
8 Switzerland should be established, a state without  
9 arms and a state founded on the principle of not  
10 menacing others or not being menaced by others. Yu  
11 Chun-han's opinion further was if a national defense  
12 army were to be established to protect the northeastern  
13 area then, in the light of the fact that in 1929 the  
14 Manchurian armies were defeated by Soviet forces with-  
15 out any resistance and in the light of the fact that  
16 as a result -- in the light of the fact that after  
17 the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident the Manchurian  
18 army forces and troops were squelched by the Japanese  
19 Army, then this northeastern area must have an army  
20 which can put up against both the Japanese and the  
21 Russian armies.  
22

23 Q Please don't indulge in long statements. I  
24 wish to have an amplification on this Monroe Doctrine.

25 A That is all I can add with regard to the

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Monroe Doctrine.

1 Q As regards the attitude of the Kwantung Army  
2 towards Russia, have you heard anything about this  
3 problem?

4 A Yes, I am aware of the policy taken by  
5 Commander in Chief HONJO at that time.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Correction on the previous  
7 question: It was not the Soviet Union. "Have you  
8 ever heard of the attitude of the Kwantung Army on  
9 that point?" That is, with respect to the previous  
10 question relating to the Monroe Doctrine.

11 THE MONITOR: That is right. The rest has no  
12 correction.

13  
14 Q What was the policy of General HONJO's, the  
15 Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, in this respect?

16 A General HONJO, in the month of October and  
17 in the months of October and November, issued frequent  
18 statements and instructions stating that it was the  
19 duty of the Kwantung Army to devote itself entirely  
20 to the maintenance -- preservation of law and order,  
21 that it was not to interfere in any respect with  
22 respect to political matters, and that it should at all  
23 times adopt an attitude of watchful silence.

24 Q What was the situation in Mongolia at that  
25 time?

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1       A    I think it was toward the end of September  
2   that a Mongolian youth by the name of Kanyuruchapu,  
3   acting as the central figure in a small force created  
4   by him, attacked the Chinese troops about 250 kilo-  
5   meters northwest of Mukden at a point called Tunglian  
6   and there created an Inner Mongolia volunteer army --  
7   autonomous army.

8       Q    Now, at that time was there any movement set  
9   up in Harbin by a general by the name of Chang Chin-hui?

10      A    General Chang Chin-hui was a director of the  
11   Chinese Eastern Railway. General Chang Chin-hui was  
12   in the vicinity of Mukden at the time of the outbreak  
13   of the incident and immediately after the outbreak of  
14   the incident he returned to Harbin and, together with  
15   Ting Chao and Wang Lui-hua, who was a police chief,  
16   declared independence. However, because of the fact  
17   that General Chang Chin-hui, unlike men like Hsui Hsia  
18   and Yu Chih-shan, did not have any arms, his proclama-  
19   tion of independence was a very weak one.

20      Q    Was there any problem at that time with  
21   regard to the activities of Pu-Yi, Henry Pu-Yi?

22      A    On the 13th of November Pu-Yi returned to  
23   Manchuria.

24      Q    Please reply in a softer voice, please.  
25   What happened then?

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1 A Pu-Yi landed at Yingkow on the 13th.

2 Q Do you know anything about the circumstances  
3 under which Pu-Yi came to Manchuria?

4 A Yes, I know the circumstances as observed  
5 by the headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

6 Q Please tell us about that.

7 A As I said last week, Luo Chen-yu returned from  
8 Kiren on the 26th of September and reported Hsui Hsia  
9 and Chang Hsien were both entertained a desire to  
10 see the restoration of the monarchy, and on the 27th,  
11 that is the following day, Luo Chen-yu departed for  
12 Tientsin by way of Dairen. At the first of October  
13 there was a sudden communication from the headquarters  
14 of the Tientsin garrison. That communication was  
15 to the effect that Henry Pu-Yi was willing to go to  
16 Manchuria if he had the support of the thirty million  
17 people inhabiting that area and if he were to go on  
18 the understanding that the Japanese would support him  
19 in his return to Manchuria, but that he felt that it  
20 was not yet the time for him to go. About this time  
21 we were in receipt of an information that Chin-liao,  
22 who was a central figure in the Lianning Committee for  
23 the Maintenance of Peace and Order had gone to Tientsin  
24 with the aim of carrying on a movement to bring Pu-Yi  
25 into Manchuria. Therein clamor and voices in support



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1 of the restoration was heard from Dairen and various  
2 parts of Manchuria.

3 Q What did the Kwantung Army do in this respect?

4 A I think it was in the latter part of October --  
5 I forget the exact date -- Colonel DOHIHARA was called  
6 to Tientsin -- was dispatched to Tientsin.

7 Q What was the mission given to Colonel DOHIHARA?

8 A Colonel DOHIHARA was dispatched to Tientsin  
9 at the personal will and intention of General HONJO  
10 himself and had no connection whatsoever with the  
11 general staff office or the War Ministry in Tokyo.  
12 Generally there were two assignments given to DOHIHARA  
13 in his trip to Tienstin.

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1           Q   Please tell us about that.

2           A   One of those assignments was the collection  
3 of intelligence with regard to the Tientsin-Peiping  
4 area. The second assignment given Colonel DOHIHARA  
5 was to study proper measures to be taken in the  
6 event that the Chang Hsueh-liang regime, which was  
7 then quartered in Chin-chou, should move south of  
8 the Great Wall into China proper. And one of those  
9 duties was to observe into the possible attitude that  
10 might be taken by Chinese generals in the Peiping-  
11 Tientsin area in the event that the Chang Army,  
12 that is, the army of Chang Hsueh-liang, should with-  
13 draw in the direction of Tientsin. Another was an  
14 entirely military study around the question that  
15 if in case the Chang Hsueh-liang Army should withdraw  
16 into North China, and in the event that the Chang Army  
17 should clash with the Japanese forces there, and in  
18 the event as a result if the Kwantung Army -- the  
19 services of the Kwantung Army would be necessary, what  
20 the Japanese side should do in such an event. That  
21 was one of the assignments given to him, the study  
22 of purely military problems. And in such a case,  
23 because of the fact that there were all kinds of  
24 clamor and voices heard in the Tientsin-Peiping area  
25 at that time, to sound out with what kind of feeling

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1 Pu-Yi would or would not like to go to Manchuria.

2 Especially with respect to this third point  
3 relating to Pu-Yi's return to Manchuria, General HONJO  
4 gave very strict instructions to Colonel DOHIHARA  
5 not to make any commitments whatsoever as to whether  
6 or not Pu-Yi was to become chief executive or  
7 Emperor of Manchuria.

8 Q From what you have told me, I have gathered  
9 these words: that Colonel DOHIHARA was dispatched  
10 in accordance with the personal views entertained  
11 by General HONJO.

12 THE MONITOR: That is, went to Tientsin at  
13 the personal orders of General HONJO.

14 A It was the orders of Commander-in-Chief  
15 HONJO of the Kwantung Army in accordance with the  
16 carrying out of his official duties, and so it was  
17 the personal orders of General HONJO in his official  
18 capacity, but not in his private capacity. Not only  
19 with respect to Colonel DOHIHARA but with respect  
20 to other staff officers of the Kwantung Army, General  
21 HONJO had the authority to dispatch them for various  
22 purposes.

23 Q Were there any liaison from Colonel DOHIHARA  
24 who went to Tientsin?

25 A I think it was around the first part of

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1 November that DOHIHARA contacted the headquarters  
2 of the Kwantung Army reporting that Pu-Yi would like  
3 to go to Manchuria as soon as possible and that Pu-Yi,  
4 himself, entertained the idea that if he went, the  
5 problem of Ma Chan-shan would be settled and that  
6 the people of Mongolia would come under his following,  
7 that is, would support him; and that he would like to  
8 establish his government in Kirin. At the same time  
9 Colonel DOHIHARA inquired what he should do in view  
10 of the fact that the Japanese Consul-General KAWASHIMA  
11 in Tientsin was opposed to Pu-Yi's going to Manchuria.

12 Q Please use shorter sentences. What steps  
13 did the Kwantung Army take?

14 A Thereupon, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung  
15 Army, MIYAKE, instructed DOHIHARA to put the matter  
16 off because of the fact that there was still various  
17 unsettled military problems in Nun-Kiang in Hei-lung-  
18 kiang Province.

19 Q What did Colonel DOHIHARA do after this?

20 A Right after that DOHIHARA sent another  
21 communication to the headquarters of the Kwantung  
22 Army reporting that Pu-Yi wanted to cross the Liao-Ho  
23 before it froze.

24 Q What happened after that?

25 A The Kwantung Army's attitude then underwent

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1 no change and the same instructions were issued again.

2 Q Then?

3 A I think it was around on the night of the  
4 11th of November that a telegram came from the  
5 Tientsin Army to the effect that it was moving on  
6 to Yingkow on the morning of the 12th--to the fact  
7 that Pu-Yi was going to Yingkow on the morning of  
8 the 12th and therefore asked the Kwantung Army to  
9 do what it could for him. This was to enable  
10 Pu-Yi to escape from an uprising which had occurred  
11 in Tientsin from around the 8th of November. On  
12 the 12th a messenger was dispatched to Yingkow to  
13 receive Pu-Yi, but since Pu-Yi did not land, this  
14 messenger returned. Pu-Yi landed on the 13th, that  
15 is, on the following day unexpectedly.

16 Q Then what steps did the Kwantung Army take  
17 with respect to Pu-Yi?

18 A Because of the fact that Pu-Yi landed without  
19 any previous advice and suddenly on the 13th, the  
20 Kwantung Army was at a loss as to where to put him  
21 up. He was taken to a hot spring called Tang-kantzu  
22 near An-shan.

23 Q What happened after that?

24 A Thereupon, there was a sudden unexpected  
25 attack by Manchurian bandits on Tang-Kantzu. Although

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1 Pu-Yi was desirous of going to Kirin and Hsi-Hsia  
2 was also anxious to have Pu-Yi come to Kirin, and  
3 because of the fact that the Kwantung Army had very  
4 rigid and strict instructions from the central  
5 authorities, it decided to bring Pu-Yi to Port  
6 Arthur for preliminary consultations before making  
7 any decisions.

8 THE INTERPRETER: A slight correction.

9 A (Continuing): The Kwantung Army, because of  
10 strict instructions from the central authorities,  
11 decided to take Pu-Yi to Port Arthur to segregate  
12 him from the various factions which were interested  
13 in him.

14 Q Orders from the central authorities to  
15 which you refer now, what were they?

16 A It was towards the end of September or the  
17 early part of October that General SUGIYAMA, Vice  
18 Minister of War, acting on the orders of the War  
19 Minister MINAMI, telegraphed instructions that the  
20 Kwantung Army should not in any way connect itself  
21 with the movement to restore the monarchy in Manchuria.  
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1 Q What was the attitude of the Manchurian  
2 people with regard to the arrival of Pu-Yi in  
3 Manchuria?

4 A I am aware to some extent on that question.

5 Q Please explain simply.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

7 MR. TAVENNER: Your Honor, about two  
8 questions back the witness referred to a telegram  
9 that was received regarding Pu-Yi. As there was  
10 no question asked to bring it within the rule  
11 announced yesterday, I desire that that answer be  
12 struck, and so move.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Whether you object or not,  
14 we will not treat any of these answers as evidence  
15 of the contents of any document. Independently of  
16 the attitude of counsel the Court has a duty to  
17 give such effect only to this evidence as it should  
18 have according to the rules that we understand and  
19 apply. I say that once for all time. It will be  
20 understood that that is so throughout the trial.

21 Q Please tell us very simply the attitude  
22 of the Manchurian people with regard to the presence  
23 of Pu-Yi in Manchuria.

24 A Chang Hai-pen, of Taonan, made a monetary  
25 presentation of 200,000 yuan to Pu-Yi, and also



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1 sent an emissary to welcome Pu-Yi to Manchuria.  
2 Chang Hai-pen, of Taonan, sent a very prominent  
3 emissary to Port Arthur to welcome Pu-Yi.

4 Q Isn't there anything else?

5 A Yes. We are in receipt of information  
6 that a Chinese by the name of Lao Tan-yan went to  
7 see Pu-Yi and talked to him, which was a little  
8 later on.

9 Q How about the Mongolians?

10 A Ling Sheng, son of the chief of a tribe  
11 in Kulunbur, called on Pu-Yi at Port Arthur.

12 Q What treatment did the Kwantung Army accord  
13 to Pu-Yi?

14 A Pu-Yi was placed under protection in Port  
15 Arthur, under the protection of the administrative  
16 office of the Kwantung leased territory, and the  
17 Kwantung Army took such action upon consultation  
18 of the Consul General and the administrative office  
19 of the territory, and prohibited any interviews  
20 between Pu-Yi and Japanese.

21 Q How about his interviews with Manchurians?

22 A Pu-Yi's meeting with Manchurians was free  
23 to the extent that no personal harm would be caused  
24 upon him. That was the regulation adopted by the  
25 administrative government office for the Kwantung

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1 leased area -- territory.

2 Q In what sort of a place did Pu-Yi stay  
3 in Port Arthur?

4 A At the Yamato hotel.

5 Q Does the witness know anything about the  
6 guidance of autonomy -- self-government guiding  
7 board, which had just come into existence about  
8 then?

9 A Yes, I am aware of the provincial self-  
10 government guiding board.

11 Q What were the relations between this body  
12 and the Kwantung Army?

13 A As far as the Kwantung Army is concerned  
14 it was merely to the extent that the third section  
15 of the Kwantung Army headquarters dealing with  
16 preservation of law and order, and the fourth  
17 section of the same headquarters, dealing with press  
18 relations, merely contacted this body.

19 Q Were there any facts to the effect that  
20 merely officers of the Kwantung Army were in any way  
21 connected with this body?

22 A No.

23 Q Was there any fact to the effect that  
24 money was given to this body by the Kwantung Army?  
25

A No. I have heard, however, that the

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1 committee for the maintenance of law and order for  
2 Liaoning Province gave money to this body.

3 Q Does the witness know anything about the  
4 independence of the Liaoning provincial government?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Please state to us very simply.

7 A On the third of November after Yu Chun-han  
8 had an interview with General HONJO -- met Yuan  
9 Chin-kai -- Yu Chun-han, giving every support to  
10 Yuan Chin-kai, had the latter change the name of the  
11 Liaoning committee for the maintenance of law --  
12 peace -- and order, into the Liaoning public --  
13 Liaoning public office, and had him proclaim the  
14 independence of that province.

15 THE PRESIDENT: That is repetitive.

16 A Member of the Court has made a calculation  
17 based on the prosecution's figures and it appears  
18 that the defense are taking twenty-five per cent  
19 more time. That is alarming. But, as he points  
20 out, of course there are only five defense phases,  
21 as against twelve prosecution phases. Moreover,  
22 the time devoted by the defense to such phases as  
23 atrocities and tying-in can be expected to be  
24 negligible. Then, of course, we have the individual  
25 accused to hear.

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1 But the time we have wasted on this witness,  
2 who has taken days or will take days, where hours  
3 should suffice if we had an affidavit, strongly  
4 stresses the point that we should have affidavits  
5 in all cases. The defense will not be prejudiced  
6 by affidavits.

7 Despite the efforts of this Japanese counsel  
8 this witness is most discursive, as most Japanese  
9 witnesses are.

10 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, the evidence  
11 that the defense is putting in now will represent  
12 approximately two thirds of our case, whereas this  
13 that the prosecution put in was just the commencement  
14 of theirs, and, as you will see, there are fewer  
15 phases, but most of our evidence will be put in in  
16 the general phase, almost two-thirds of it.

17 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
18 minutes.

19 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
20 taken until 1100, after which the proceed-  
21 ings were resumed as follows:)  
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1 THE PRESIDENT: I have received a memorandum  
2 signed by certain members of the press pointing out  
3 that the distribution of copies of the proceedings  
4 in chambers has been stopped. I gave no directions  
5 preventing the distribution of proceedings in chambers,  
6 but I did say that according to the British tradition  
7 in which I am steeped, the publication of proceedings  
8 in chambers is contempt of court.

9 Mr. OKAMOTO.

10 BY MR. OKAMOTO (Continuing):

11 Q Mr. Witness, have you ever read the Lytton  
12 Report?

13 A Yes, the Japanese translation of the report.

14 Q According to the Lytton Report, there is a  
15 statement to the effect that General Tsang Shih-yi,  
16 who was stationed in Mukden at that time, was held  
17 under the custody of the Kwantung Army.

18 A Yes, I recall that statement in the report.

19 Q Do you know whether that was a fact or not?

20 A I have never heard that he was ever held  
21 in custody.

22 Q Do you know anything about the events leading  
23 to the appointment of General Tsang Shih-yi to the  
24 chairmanship of the provincial government of Mukden?  
25

A I do.



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Q Please tell us very simply.

1 A Tsang Shih-yi is a native of Fengtien Province,  
2 that is, Mukden Province, and at first he did not make  
3 up his mind. But with the support and at the persuasion  
4 of Chao Chin-po, Ting Chin-hsiu and Yu Chun-han, he  
5 accepted the post of provincial governor.

6 Q Were there any instructions from the  
7 Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, General HONJO,  
8 concerning the Manchurian Incident?

9 A Yes, there was an important direction issued  
10 to the Chief of Staff, MIYAKI, and other departmental  
11 chiefs.

12 Q Please tell us what you heard then.

13 A There were four points in the policy and aim  
14 as instructed by General HONJO. One point concerned  
15 the separation of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime from  
16 the Nanking government. Another was his observations  
17 on the establishment of various regimes in various  
18 areas in Manchuria. One was his ideas with regard to  
19 the foremost and prominent leaders of Manchuria.  
20 The fourth point was the Japanese attitude and state  
21 of mind with regard to the settlement of the incident --  
22 preparations.

23 Q What do you mean by the severance of relations  
24 with the Chang Hsueh-liang regime from the Nanking  
25



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government?

1           A    That was the idea that in the light of the  
2 development of the situation in Manchuria at that time,  
3 there was no room for the return of Chang Hsueh-liang  
4 to Manchuria; and also that the coming of the authority  
5 of the Nanking government into the area would worse  
6 confound the situation there; that there was no alter-  
7 native in order to establish that as far as Yu Chun-han  
8 was concerned he believed there was no alternative  
9 but to establish an independent state in order to  
10 found a state calculated to promote the well-being  
11 and security of the people in that area -- that there  
12 was no alternative but to have men like Yu Chun-han  
13 establish an independent state in order to secure  
14 the well-being of the people in that area.  
15

16           Q    Will you please explain the second point;  
17 namely, the establishment of independent regimes in  
18 various districts?

19           A    The second point in the instructions issued  
20 by General HONJO, that in regard to the various  
21 independent movements in Manchuria no outside power  
22 should be exercised or no outside interference should  
23 be given -- no outside support should be given nor any  
24 outside interference exercised, but that time was  
25 necessary in order to settle the incident there. That

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1 is to say, that outside pressure should not be applied  
2 merely for the sake of trying to settle the issues  
3 there as promptly as possible.

4 Q The third point, namely, the problem of the  
5 highest leaders in Manchuria and Mongolia?

6 A The third point in the instructions of  
7 General HONJO, that in order to found a new regime in  
8 Manchuria they should not stick to any one person such  
9 as Pu-Yi but should give full consideration to the  
10 public opinion of the thirty million inhabitants of  
11 the area.

12 Q And now for the fourth, namely, the mental  
13 preparation of the Japanese; what were they?

14 A The fourth point in the instructions of  
15 General HONJO was in order to secure Japanese interests  
16 there, it was necessary to promote collaboration  
17 between Japan and China, to foster a feeling of harmony  
18 and cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese  
19 peoples and thereby to establish their relationship  
20 on a long-term or long-range basis and thereby to uproot  
21 the evils interfering with the promotion of such rela-  
22 tionships.

23 Q Where did the Chang Hsueh-liang regime have  
24 its headquarters?

25 A In Chin-chou.

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Q What was the situation around Chin-shou then?

1 A The regime established itself in the vicinity  
2 of Chin-shou, and there the Chang Hsueh-liang forces  
3 increased its numerical strength and prepared trenches  
4 in and around that area.

5 Q Do you know that there was rioting in  
6 Tientsin towards the end of November?

7 A Yes, I know.

8 Q What steps did the Kwantung Army take with  
9 respect to this?

10 A I am aware of those steps.

11 Q Please tell us very simply the steps taken  
12 by the Kwantung Army.

13 A I think it was the 26th of November when  
14 the commander of the Tientsin garrison sent a tele-  
15 graphic communication to the Kwantung Army asking for  
16 reinforcements in view of the military uprising which  
17 had occurred in Tientsin.

18 Q What did the Kwantung Army do?

19 A Commander-in-chief HONJO made a decision  
20 to bring a part of the forces in Hsin Min to Mukden.  
21 Correction: Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army  
22 HONJO decided to bring a part of the forces at Mukden  
23 to Hsin Min, and then to bring back the second division  
24 stationed at Tsitsihar to Mukden.  
25

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Q And then?

A And thereafter he began preparations for advance toward Chin-chou.

Q Then, am I to take it that they advanced to Chin-chou?

A The troops which were dispatched to Hsin Min were called back after they had gone part of the way.

Q What were the reasons therefor?

A There were two directions: One a communication from the commander of the Hsin Min garrison that the military uprising in the Tientsin area had relaxed, and also from the central authorities saying that dispatch of troops must not be carried out.

Q What were the deployment of the Kwantung troops which were dispatched at that time to Chin-chou -- at the time that troops were dispatched to Chin-chou and withdrawn?

A About two battalions at Tsitsihar, in and around Tsitsihar; other units were for the most part concentrated along the railway zone attached to the South Manchuria Railway.

Q Are you aware of the fact that vice-chief of staff NINOMIYA visited in Manchuria at that time?

A Yes, I do.

Q For what reasons did General NINOMIYA go to

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1 Manchuria?

2 A Liaison for the general staff office in Tokyo,  
3 and study of the situation in Manchuria.

4 Q Were there any differences of opinion between  
5 the Kwantung Army and the central authorities?

6 A Yes. Opinion, or the views of the Kwantung  
7 Army were submitted very frequently to the central  
8 authorities, and there was a difference of opinion  
9 resulting therefrom.

10 Q Was there any relation with this fact when  
11 General NINOMIYA went to Manchuria?

12 A Yes, related.

13 Q Please tell us about that briefly.

14 A Public rumors afloat at that time was to the  
15 effect that the Kwantung Army -- there were officers  
16 in the Kwantung Army entertaining very strong views,  
17 including desire to put the commander-in-chief under  
18 confinement, or to the effect that the younger staff  
19 officers of the Kwantung Army were dispatching mes-  
20 sages to Tokyo by themselves without the approval of  
21 their senior officers. It was the desire of the Kwan-  
22 tung Army to have General NINOMIYA understand that all  
23 important documents and telegrams sent out by the  
24 Kwantung Army have the approval and authorization of  
25 not only the commanding general of the Kwantung Army,



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1 but also its chief of staff, and the commander-in-  
2 chief of the Kwantung Army explained the situation  
3 and had this situation understood by General NINOMIYA.

4 Q From your observation, Mr. Witness, what  
5 sort of man was the commander-in-chief, General  
6 HONJO?

7 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please--

8 A A very strict disciplinarian and meticulous  
9 as to details. A very serious person. He was strict  
10 in the conduct of business and very meticulous as  
11 to details.

12 MR. TAVENNER: I had arisen to object to  
13 the question and answer. So I will now confine my  
14 objection to this type of cross-examination, as it is  
15 certainly irrelevant and immaterial to any issues.

16 THE PRESIDENT: It would not be allowed in  
17 any court that I have been associated with. But it  
18 doesn't follow that it would be disallowed here.

19 I think the objection is well taken.

20 Q Does the witness know anything about the  
21 situation in China at that time -- that is, on the  
22 Chinese side?

23 A You mean China proper?

24 Q In the Chang Hsueh-liang regime.

25 A In the Chin-chou area plain clothes men,

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1 brigands and various police attempted to create dis-  
2 turbances and uprisings in southern Manchuria, that is,  
3 police which had turned into brigands.

4 Q Does the witness know anything about the  
5 proposal to set up a neutralized zone?

6 A Yes, I know of a proposal made by the  
7 Chinese side.

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1 Q What steps were taken in respect to this?

2 A Negotiations were begun by Nanking and other  
3 parties concerned but this proposal was withdrawn as  
4 a result of our withdrawal of troops from Hsin-Min.  
5 That is, these negotiations were conducted at Nanking  
6 but the proposal was withdrawn because of Japanese  
7 troop withdrawals from Hsin-Min.

8 Q What was the bandit situation then --  
9 situation with respect to banditry?

10 A In the railway area south of Mukden there  
11 were during the month of November about one thousand  
12 occurrences of bandit action along the railway zone  
13 involving ten some odd thousands bandits.

14 Q Do you know anything further about the  
15 situation in and around Chin-Chou?

16 A In the bandit armies in and around Chin-Chou  
17 there were soldiers of the regular army in plain clothes  
18 and along the first line there were soldiers on both  
19 banks of the Liao-Ho River. The first line of these  
20 forces extended to the Liao-Ho.

21 Q What steps did the Kwantung Army take in  
22 view of this situation?

23 A The Kwantung Army sent its opinions and views  
24 to the Central authorities with regard to the possible  
25 withdrawal of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime from Chin-Chou

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1 to south of the Great Wall or into China proper,  
2 and the Kwantung Army itself had ideas on how to  
3 meet the situation.

4 Q What attitude did Tokyo take with respect  
5 to this?

6 A As for the Tokyo Government, the Japanese  
7 Minister in Nanking and the Japanese Consular and  
8 Embassy in Nanking as well as the military attache  
9 began negotiations with respect to withdrawal of forces  
10 from Chin Chou.

11 Q Is the witness aware of the fact of any  
12 changes -- do you know that the policy of the Central  
13 authorities in Japan changed?

14 A In the first part of November Chang Hsueh-  
15 liang promised to withdraw but did not carry out this  
16 promise.

17 Q What steps were taken then?

18 A At that time from notification from Tokyo  
19 and other sources we learned that the Japanese Govern-  
20 ment had made an important proposal to the League of  
21 Nations with regard to punitive measures against  
22 bandits.

23 Q What steps did the Kwantung Army take then?

24 A The Kwantung Army about this time formulated  
25 a plan to dispatch a military emissary directly to the

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1 Chin-Chou regime.

2 Q What sort of emissary was this -- military  
3 emissary was this?

4 A One of the purposes of the military emissary  
5 was to have the Chin-Chou regime stop its attempts  
6 and policies to create disturbances and uprisings in  
7 Southern Manchuria, and the other purpose was to re-  
8 quest the Chin-Chou regime to withdraw but this plan  
9 proved a failure.

10 Q What attitude did Tsang Shih-i of the  
11 Fengtien province take?

12 A Tsang Shih-i dispatched his right-hand man  
13 to Peiping to request Chang Hsueh-liang to withdraw  
14 his forces from Chin-Chou.

15 Q Do you know anything about the attitude  
16 taken by Chang Hsueh-liang as a result of this?

17 A At first he agreed to withdraw to Japan  
18 but he did not carry that agreement out.

19 Q Please tell us very briefly the steps taken  
20 by the Kwantung Army?

21 A The Kwantung Army devoted its efforts to re-  
22 store and preserve law and order in the area east of  
23 the Liao-Ho River.

24 Q Do you know the fact that there was a change,  
25 political change, in Japan at that time?



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1           A    Yes.

2           Q    Was there any collision between the Kwantung  
3 Army and the forces of Chang Hsueh-liang at that time?

4           A    Yes, there was a collision between the Chang  
5 army and the Kwantung Army east of Yinkow -- west of  
6 Yinkow, at a place called Tien-Chuan-Tai.

7           Q    Please state briefly what steps were taken  
8 by the Japanese Government and the Kwantung Army as  
9 a result of this incident?

10          A    The Japanese Government issued a statement  
11 on the 27th of December and on the following day, the  
12 28th, the Kwantung Army crossed the Liao-Ho River  
13 line and began a punitive expedition against the  
14 brigands, against the banditry in that area.

15          Q    What happened as a result of this operation  
16 around Chin-Chow area?

17          A    Without much resistance the enemy retreated.

18          Q    How was this last measure taken -- what steps  
19 were later taken with regard to the aftermath?

20          A    A part of the 20th division engaged in the  
21 revival and preservation of law and order in and around  
22 Chin-Chou and later officials from Mukden arrived to  
23 take over that task.  
24  
25

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1 Q What was the deployment of the Kwantung  
2 Army at that time?

3 A After part of the Kwantung forces entered  
4 Chin Chou the forces were divided, and generally  
5 the work of the Kwantung Army was devoted to the  
6 preservation and maintenance of law and order in  
7 the South Manchurian area.

8 Q Do you know anything about the situation  
9 concerning Koreans at that time?

10 A Various Koreans who were in prison were  
11 released, and a large number of Koreans in Chien-  
12 Tao entertained high hopes as to their future.

13 Q What was the situation in Mongolia?

14 A About the middle of December various  
15 Mongolians met at Tai-lai, located midway between  
16 Tao-nan and Tsitsihar, and as a result of consulta-  
17 tions among the leaders of the Mongolians, at the  
18 end of December decision was made to create an  
19 independent autonomous regime for Mongolia, at a  
20 conference held at Chen-Chia-Tun.

21 Q Do you know anything about the situation  
22 existing in North Manchuria at that time?

23 A There were internecine struggles between  
24 General Hsi Hsia and a number of persons such as  
25 Li-Tu and Ting-Chao who were not on good terms with

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him.

1 Q Did you receive any information concern-  
2 ing this from Harbin?

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q What information was this?

5 A It was information to the effect that  
6 Ting-Chao and Hsi Hsia after bringing Chang Chan-hui  
7 under custody would establish their lines east of  
8 Harbin and resist Kirin.

9 Q Did you receive any information concern-  
10 ing this from Japanese residents in Harbin?

11 A As a result of that action on the part of  
12 Hsi Hsia the Kirin Army, under the leadership of  
13 Yu-Shen-Cheng, started an attack in the direction  
14 of Harbin, as a result of which we received messages  
15 from Harbin asking for the dispatch of forces for  
16 the purpose of protection -- that is, for the  
17 purpose of protecting the Harbin area.

18 Q Did the Kwantung Army dispatch any troops?

19 A Yes, a part of its forces were dispatched  
20 with an understanding with the authorities in  
21 Tokyo.

22 Q Previously, Mr. Witness, you said that  
23 there were strict orders from Tokyo to the effect  
24 that troops were not to be dispatched. Was this an  
25

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1 exception, then, to this rule?

2 THE MONITOR: Troops were not to be dis-  
3 patched to Northern Manchuria. Isn't this in-  
4 consistent with your present statement?

5 A Yes, there was a difference between the  
6 situation in Manchuria and the Japanese Government  
7 policy toward that situation as it existed in  
8 September and the situation as it existed in Manchuria  
9 ~~at that time~~ and the Japanese position with regard  
10 to the protection of its interests there and the  
11 Japanese Government's policy in this area.

12 Q Please tell us briefly concerning the  
13 dispatch of troops by the Kwantung Army at that  
14 time?

15 A With regard to the dispatch of troops to  
16 Harbin, an understanding was sought with the  
17 authorities of the Chinese Eastern Railways with  
18 regard to the use of the southern lines of that  
19 railway through the Japanese consul general at  
20 Harbin, and two battalions were dispatched to that  
21 area in accordance with this understanding.

22 Q Do you recall the dates of the dispatch  
23 of troops to Chin-Chou and Harbin to which you  
24 testified sometime ago?

25 A Yes, I do.

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1 Q What was the date of the dispatch of  
2 troops to Harbin?

3 A Troops were dispatched to Harbin toward  
4 the end of January, 1932.

5 Q And the dispatch of troops to Chin Chou?

6 A The end of December, 1931.

7 Q Had the Government of Japan changed then?

8 A Yes.

9 Q What cabinet was it then?

10 A The INUKAI Cabinet.

11 Q What was the measures adopted after the  
12 dispatch of troops to Harbin, after Japanese  
13 troops entered Harbin?

14 A The policy was adopted not to use Japanese  
15 troops for the preservation of law and order within  
16 the city of Harbin. That job was entrusted to  
17 Chinese hands. The main job of the Japanese  
18 forces was to check the retreating of the forces of  
19 Ting-Chao.  
20

21 Q What happened to this Ting-Chao?

22 A Ting-Chao returned to the Manchurian side  
23 and was made provincial governor of An-Tung and  
24 councilor of Manchukuo.

25 Q Were there any other officers who pledged  
allegiance to Manchuria besides Ting-Chao?



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1           A    Yes, there were many.

2           Q    What happened to those soldiers who  
3 surrendered?

4           A    Defeated and surrendered soldiers were  
5 received and employed in the Manchurian -- in the  
6 Manchukuo Army or in the Manchukuo police, or were  
7 absorbed into general civilian life.

8           Q    Were there any questions as to the prison-  
9 ers of war camps?

10          A    There were no prisoners of war. There  
11 were no such things as prisoners of war.

12          Q    And the reasons therefor?

13          A    At that time the Japanese attitude was,  
14 those who took a hostile attitude toward the  
15 Japanese forces would be punished, but those who  
16 had ceased resistance would be welcomed and ab-  
17 sorbed into ordinary Manchurian life. They were  
18 not treated at all as prisoners of war.

19          Q    Were there any discussions or arrangements  
20 made between the central Japanese authorities and  
21 the Kwantung Army at or about January, 1932?

22          A    Yes.

23          Q    What kind of consultations?

24          A    At the request of the general staff office  
25 in Tokyo the Commanding General of the Kwantung

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1 Army had Colonel ITAGAKI make a trip to Tokyo.

2 Q What mission did he have then?

3 A The purpose of Colonel ITAGAKI's trip  
4 was to try and explain the conditions within the  
5 Kwantung Army and the situation as it was then  
6 developing in various parts of Manchuria, and at  
7 the same time to have the central authorities  
8 understand the determination and will of General  
9 HONJO.

10 Q What was this determination of Commander  
11 in Chief HONJO?

12 A It was the expression of a very important  
13 determination on the part of General HONJO that in  
14 the light of the independence movements then  
15 developing in Manchuria there was no way out to  
16 settle the Manchurian issues other than to settle  
17 them in accordance with this independence movement  
18 as it gained maturity.

19 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until  
20 half-past one.

21 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
22 taken.)  
23  
24  
25

## AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330, Justice Delfin Jaranilla, Member from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, not sitting.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

Apparently he has finished his examination in chief.

Mr. Tavenner.

MR. T. OKAMOTO: I am sorry I am late.

- - -

TADASHI KATAKURA, called as a witness on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

Q Mr. Witness, you were testifying about a resolution of Commander-in-Chief HONJO.

MR. T. OKAMOTO: Japanese Court Reporter, will you read that part of the answer, please?

(Whereupon, the last answer was read by the Japanese Court Reporter.)

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THE MONITOR: Will the English Court  
Reporter read the corresponding part of the last  
answer, please?

(Whereupon, the last answer was read  
by the official court reporter.)

Q That determination or decision by General  
HONJO -- was it a recommendation made to the Central  
Government?

A That was an expression of the Commanding  
General HONJO's resolve in the light of the objec-  
tive situation then prevailing.

Q Do you know anything which became a ground  
for General HONJO's determination?

A Yes, I do.

Q Will you explain it briefly?

A While on the one hand General HONJO held a  
conversation with Yu Chun-han, on the other Colonel  
ITAGAKI made a tour of the various areas in Manchuria  
to listen to the various views and opinions enter-  
tained by leading people, that is, Manchurians in  
that country. As a result of this interview between  
General HONJO and Yu Chun-han, as well as the  
investigation carried on by Colonel ITAGAKI to get  
the views and opinions of leading Manchurians, it  
became known to the people of Manchuria, that is,

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1 to the people on the Manchurian side, that we, that  
2 is, Japan, or the Kwantung Army, had no intention  
3 whatsoever to occupy Manchuria or to make -- or  
4 that the Japanese had not -- did not entertain any  
5 territorial designs on Manchuria.

6 THE MONITOR: It appears that the witness'  
7 statement was not understood by the reporter. We  
8 should like to have the witness repeat it.

9 A (Continued) While the people of Man-  
10 churia expressed great joy after learning that it  
11 was Japan's real intentions not to occupy Manchuria  
12 or that Japan had no territorial designs on Manchuria,  
13 at the same time these same Manchurians said that  
14 they would be very much embarrassed and placed in a  
15 difficult and embarrassing position if the Nanking  
16 authority should come into Manchuria or if the  
17 Cheng Hsueh-ling regime should return to Manchuria.

18 THE MONITOR: They were unanimous in this  
19 opinion.

20 Q According to your opinion, did it become  
21 the ground for the determination taken by General  
22 HONJO?

23 THE MONITOR: Do you mean this to be the  
24 basis for General HONJO's resolve?

25 A Yes.



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1 Q Did you hear anything personally from the  
2 Commander-in-Chief, General HONJO, about his resolve?

3 A Yes, I heard from General HONJO personally  
4 at a meeting of staff officers of the Kwantung Army  
5 on the occasion of Colonel ITAGAKI's trip to Tokyo.

6 Q After returning from Tokyo did Colonel  
7 ITAGAKI make his report?

8 A Yes.

9 Q What did he say in his report, if you know?

10 THE MONITOR: Correction: Did you hear  
11 what he said in that report?

12 A I heard the report because I was present  
13 at the time it was made.

14 Q Please state what you heard about that  
15 report.

16 A Both the War Ministry and the General Staff  
17 Office understood the situation prevailing in Man-  
18 churia, but there was no intention whatsoever on  
19 the part of ARAKI and other military authorities as  
20 to the establishment of an independent state. How-  
21 ever, both the War Minister and General Staff authori-  
22 ties were -- understood that the Chang regime could  
23 not be set up -- could not return to Manchuria,  
24 nor that the Nanking authority could be established  
25 in Manchuria. However, it was the intention of the

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1 Central authorities in Tokyo to see to it that law  
2 and order was revived, preserved, and maintained in  
3 the various parts of Manchuria, together with the --  
4 in accordance with the movement then spreading in  
5 Manchuria toward autonomy and independence. Slight  
6 correction: it was the intention of the Tokyo  
7 authorities by keeping -- by having the Kwantung  
8 Army on the spot keeping in close contact with the  
9 various local regimes to keep and preserve law and  
10 order in various parts of Manchuria.

11 Q Were there any other occurrences about  
12 liaison with Tokyo outside of what you have just  
13 stated?

14 A During the absence of Colonel ITAGAKI from  
15 Manchuria, that is, while he was in Tokyo, General  
16 HONJO held an important interview with Ambassador  
17 YOSHIZAWA, who was en route back to Tokyo from  
18 Geneva by way of Manchuria. Addition: And general  
19 HONJO transmitted an important message to the  
20 Ambassador.  
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1 Q Were you present when conversation was  
2 carried out between the two?

3 A Chief of Staff MIYAKE, Lieutenant Colonel  
4 ISHIHARA and I were present at that interview.

5 Q What did Commander HONJO tell on that  
6 occasion?

7 A Generally, he mentioned three points.

8 Q Please explain them briefly.

9 A Something to the effect of which I have  
10 already testified, that is, that the point with  
11 respect to the rapid maturity of the independence  
12 movement in Manchuria and General HONJO's idea that  
13 the settlement of the situation in Manchuria should  
14 be settled in accordance with this movement -- with  
15 the growth of this movement.

16 The second point which General HONJO  
17 mentioned to Ambassador YOSHIZAWA was that in meeting  
18 the situation then prevailing in Manchuria he would  
19 not like to see the Manchurian issue settled as a  
20 political issue between political parties for their  
21 respective political -- purely private political --  
22 selfish political benefits.

23 The third was General HONJO's hope that in  
24 the light of the fact that the soldiers who had  
25 participated and devoted their best efforts in the

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1 Incident came from fishing and farming villages in  
2 Japan, he would like to see the conditions in their  
3 respective -- conditions in their fishing and village  
4 communities improved and thereby -- and then give  
5 peace and comfort of mind to these officers and men,  
6 and to have the benefit of the incident spread to  
7 these villages, both fishing and farming.

8 Lastly, General HONJO added in his remarks  
9 to Ambassador YOSHIZAWA that he would like to see  
10 some kind of mission despatched from Japan to the  
11 United States to have the American Government and  
12 people understand the situation better out of his  
13 personal concern for the relationships between the  
14 two countries.

15 Q What reply did Ambassador YOSHIZAWA give  
16 to it?

17 A Ambassador YOSHIZAWA replied saying that  
18 after he had entered Manchuria on his return from  
19 Geneva, it appeared to him that the curtain had gone  
20 up, that the clouds seemed to have been cleared,  
21 and that his feelings were now much different now  
22 that he was in Manchuria than the feeling that had  
23 overcome him while he was in Geneva and that he  
24 has now a pretty good grasp of the situation in  
25 Manchuria and that he would do his best after he



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1 returned to Japan in carrying out the hopes and  
2 desires of General HONJO.

3 Q Please state, if you know, the activities  
4 and entourage of Pu-Yi at that time.

5 THE MONITOR: People close to Pu-Yi.

6 A Yes, I am informed.

7 Q Please explain briefly on it.

8 A It appears there was some disagreement of  
9 views between the group centered around Cheng  
10 Hsiao-hsu and the group centered around Lo Chen-Yu.

11 Q What was the difference in views between  
12 the two?

13 A It was Lo Chen-Yu's contention that if  
14 Pu-Yi was to be brought back to Manchuria, the  
15 Manchurian dynasty must be restored or that Pu-Yi  
16 should be set upon the throne. The Cheng Hsiao-hsu  
17 group entertained the idea that it would be all  
18 right if Pu-Yi became the highest leader of Man-  
19 churia first -- that is, that it would be all right  
20 if he first of all became the foremost leader of  
21 Manchuria.

22 Q What did the Kwantung Army, and particularly  
23 General HONJO, assume towards this problem?

24 THE MONITOR: What attitude?

25 A They did not, that is, the Kwantung Army



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1 and General HONJO did not feel particularly  
2 favorably disposed to the idea of the restoration  
3 of the monarchy, but they did not touch upon the  
4 idea of -- they did not touch upon the question of  
5 Pu-Yi as a leader of Manchuria.

6 Q However, it is said that at that time the  
7 political council --

8 THE MONITOR: The Northeastern Administra-  
9 tive Council was established. Are you informed?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Will you explain the constitution of it?

12 THE MONITOR: The constitution, that is,  
13 the formation of it -- the composition of it?

14 A It was about January, 1932 when there was  
15 a joint proposal presented by Yu Chu-ha, Tsang  
16 Shih-i and Chao Hsin-Po with respect to the inde-  
17 pendence movement which was to the merging of the  
18 various -- in connection with the merging of the  
19 various independence movements.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Will you repeat the names,  
21 Mr. Witness?

22 A (Continuing): However, towards the end  
23 of January, however, there was a split in the ranks  
24 between Li-Tu and Ting-Chao on the one hand and  
25 Hsi Hsia and Yu Shen-cheng on the other hand as well

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1 as the -- which resulted in the fighting in the  
2 neighborhood of Harbin and, therefore, this movement,  
3 or this meeting was postponed until February. After  
4 this incident, towards the middle of February,  
5 Ma Chan-sha, Hsi Hsia, Tsang Shih-i and Chang Ching-  
6 hui met in Mukden. On the 16th of February these  
7 men held a conference at the home of Chao Hsin-Po  
8 in Mukden and there created the Northeastern Admini-  
9 strative Council.

10 Q Was Yu Chun-han included in that administra-  
11 tive council?

12 A No.

13 Q Why was he not included, if you know the  
14 reason?

15 THE MONITOR: Do you know why he was not  
16 included?

17 A Yes, I do know.

18 Q Please explain briefly.

19 A At that time the conference was confined  
20 principally to the leaders of the various provinces  
21 who had actual military and administrative control  
22 over their respective provinces. Yu Chuan-han did  
23 not participate in these conferences because in these  
24 respects he had no qualifications and therefore --  
25 and also because of his physical -- because he was

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physically ill or unwell.

1           Q    What attitude did the Kwantung Army assume  
2           towards the Northeastern Administrative Council,  
3           if you know?

4           A    I know.

5           Q    Please state about it briefly.

6           A    The Kwantung Army instead of intervening  
7           or participating in this council devoted itself  
8           to the gathering of information -- requested the  
9           administrative council to provide the Kwantung  
10          Army with information.

11          Q    Was Tang Yu-lin included in the Admini-  
12          strative Council at the time?

13          A    Tang Yu-lin was not included in the  
14          Council, but his name was included among those who  
15          participated in the decision of the Council, that  
16          is, he agreed to have his name included among  
17          those who participated in the decision of the  
18          Council.  
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1 Q Were the following -- did the following  
2 members close in the entourage of Pu-Yi also partici-  
3 pate in the council?

4 THE MONITOR: Did any of the close followers  
5 of Pu-Yi participate in the council?

6 A No.

7 Q Why did they not participate?

8 A This council, as I said before, consisted of  
9 the actual leaders who held political and military  
10 control in their respective provinces. These were the  
11 men who constituted this council, or if not these men  
12 their proxies, and also those from Mongolia. As to  
13 the close following of Pu-Yi, their line of thinking was  
14 that Pu-Yi would come if he had the unanimous support  
15 of the thirty million people of Manchuria.

16 Q Did Japanese also participate in that council?

17 A No.

18 Q What was the outcome of the conference of the  
19 Northeastern Administrative Council?

20 A There was unanimity of views with respect  
21 to severance of Manchuria from the Nanking Government  
22 and the Chang Hsueh-liang Regime. There was also  
23 unanimity of views with respect to the establishment  
24 of a new state. However, with respect to the national  
25 political structure there was a divergence of opinion.



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Q What were these divergence of opinions?

1 A Hsi Hsia and representatives from Mongolia  
2 advocated a monarchy, whereas Tsang Shih-i and others  
3 advocated a republican form of government.

4 Q What came out of it?

5 A Chang Hin-hui gathered together these various  
6 and conflicting opinions and came to Port Arthur with  
7 the idea of establishing a regency with a civilian  
8 government -- with a democratic form of government  
9 under a regency.

10 Q What was the result of his visit to Port  
11 Arthur? Do you know?

12 A I know.

13 Q Please explain.

14 Q Pu-Yi's last -- or the Emperor Hsuan Tung's  
15 last decision was that the national language shall be  
16 Manchurian, that the head of the state shall be a  
17 regent, that the era or calendar shall be Tatung, and  
18 that the name of the state shall be Manchukuo. As  
19 to the national flag of Manchukuo, he decided upon  
20 the five-color -- a new five colored banner.

21 Q Had any request been made by the Kwantung  
22 Army before Pu-Yi made his decision regarding those  
23 matters?  
24

25 A There was no request ever made by HONJO.



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1           Q   Mr. Witness, are you aware of the existence  
2 of some documents which were sent from Pu-Yi to  
3 General HONJO at that time?

4           A   Yes.

5           Q   Have you ever heard General HONJO read to you  
6 those documents?

7           A   Yes, there was an explanation of the gist  
8 of those documents at a conference of staff officers.

9           Q   Please state the gist of those documents as  
10 you heard.

11          A   Generally speaking the gist was that the  
12 Manchurian state would thank the Japanese for what  
13 part they had played and that they would entrust the  
14 national defense and the preservation of law and order  
15 in Manchuria to the Japanese side, but that they would  
16 do this under two or three specific conditions.  
17 Condition one was that in garrisoning or stationing  
18 Japanese troops in Manchuria the expense thereof shall  
19 be shared. The second condition was that the Japanese  
20 would be asked to superintend and control transporta-  
21 tion from the standpoint of national defense. The  
22 third condition was that in view of the fact that the  
23 principle upon which the Manchukuo state shall be  
24 founded was that of harmony among the five races they  
25 would ask the Japanese for the recommendation of some

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1 of the officials of the Manchurian Government.

2 Q What steps did General HONJO take with respect  
3 to the independence of Manchukuo?

4 A With regards to Manchuo's independence after  
5 the establishment of the new state he took a position  
6 and policy of cooperation and assistance.

7 Q According to your testimony it seems that the  
8 position or the attitude of General HONJO gradually  
9 changed. Is that true?

10 A There is no mistake.

11 Q What attitude did the various units or troops  
12 take outside of the Kwantung Army headquarters vis-a-  
13 vis that program at that time?

14 A The divisional commanders and the various army  
15 units in various parts of Manchuria devoted their time --  
16 their full time to the preservation of law and order,  
17 did not in any way concern themselves with political  
18 problems. And General HONJO did not permit these troops  
19 in the field in any manner or form to participate in  
20 political affairs.

21 Q According to the Lytton Report General TAMON,  
22 Divisional Commander TAMON, participated and assisted  
23 the independence of the Kirin Province. Do you know  
24 anything about it?

25 A When I noticed that in the Japanese text of

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1 the report I was very much astonished.

2 Q Do you know the actual circumstances?

3 A Yes, I do.

4 Q Please relate it.

5 A When Divisional Commander TAMON was dispatched  
6 to Kirin in September, 1931, he persuaded Hsi Hsia  
7 to return into the Manchurian fold and pledge his  
8 allegiance to Manchuria. He persuaded Hsi Hsia and  
9 his army to surrender and to return into the Manchurian  
10 fold. At the end of September when Hsi Hsia announced  
11 the independence of Kirin Province General TAMON was  
12 present at the ceremony, and it appears that General  
13 TAMON's advice to Hsi Hsia to surrender and his  
14 attendance at the independence ceremonies to Kirin  
15 Province was misinterpreted and mis-reported as partici-  
16 pation in the Kirin Province independence movement.

17 Q What part or what assistance did the Japanese  
18 residents in Manchuria give to the various independence  
19 movements in various provinces or the founding of the  
20 state of Manchukuo?

21 THE MONITOR: Not "or" but "and."

22 A There is some difference depending on the  
23 time.

24 Q Do you know anything about the time of --  
25 what happened at the time of the founding of the state

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1 of Manchukuo?

2 A After the founding of the state?

3 Q Before; before the founding of the state.

4 THE MONITOR: Up to the time of the founding.

5 A Yes, I am familiar.



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1 Q Please state briefly.

2 A At first some cooperation was given with respect  
3 to the maintenance of peace and order in the various  
4 districts of Manchuria and assistance to -- in the field  
5 of transportation and industry as well as in the maintenance  
6 of -- in securing the livelihood of the people -- of the  
7 Japanese residents. However, as I have said last week,  
8 they did not give any cooperation or assistance whatsoever  
9 in the various independence movements in the various  
10 provinces of Manchuria. With regard to the various  
11 independence movements to which I briefly referred, the  
12 Japanese residents in Manchuria did not give any cooper-  
13 ation or assistance. From about the end of 1931 there  
14 was some Japanese at the invitation and request of the  
15 leaders of the various provinces became advisers and  
16 cooperated in that capacity, but this was cooperation  
17 purely in the administrative field and was not cooperation  
18 in any form with respect to the conduct of the independence  
19 movement or the establishment of the new state.

20 Q Did any provision in the status of the  
21 Japanese take place due to the founding of the State of  
22 Manchukuo?

23 THE MONITOR: Wasn't there a change in the  
24 status of the Japanese as a result of the founding of the  
25 State of Manchukuo?



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1 A Yes, a very important change.

2 Q What were they?

3 A In accordance with the declaration on the  
4 founding of the State of Manchukuo and in accordance  
5 with the organic law of Manchukuo guaranteeing personal  
6 liberty or the rights of individuals, the Japanese  
7 residents of Manchuria became citizens of that country.

8 Q How about the Japanese military men?

9 A The Japanese military men and diplomats were  
10 outside because of their peculiar functions. The Japanese  
11 military men and diplomats representing Japanese organs  
12 were excepted from this.

13 THE PRESIDENT: I think that follows of course,  
14 Mr. OKAMOTO. You are overdoing this. You are only  
15 confirming what is in the Lytton Report. Of course  
16 the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese diplomats are out-  
17 side of it.

18 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I am sorry, sir.

19 Q I am now referring to the Lytton Report. It  
20 says that prior to the 18th of September, 1931, there  
21 was an independence movement in Manchuria. Now, Mr.  
22 Witness, do you know anything about it? Do you know  
23 whether there was any such movement or not?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Do you mean to say then that the Lytton Report

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1 is erroneous in saying that there was no independence  
2 movement in Manchuria prior to September 18, 1931?

3 THE MONITOR: Slight correction on the trans-  
4 lation of the question before this one: It was not the  
5 Lytton Report said such and such, but "I am referring  
6 to the Lytton Report, but do you know whether there was  
7 or was not an independence movement before September 18,  
8 1931?"

9 A It is a mistake to say that there was no independ-  
10 ence movement whatsoever before that date.

11 Q Do you know, Mr. Witness, that the Lytton  
12 Commission came to Manchuria?

13 A Yes.

14 Q How did you come to know about it?

15 A Yes, I was informed that a League of Nations  
16 Commission was coming to Manchuria at the end of 1931.  
17 Then I was informed at the end of 1931 that a League of  
18 Nations Commission was coming to Manchuria.

19 Q What action did the Kwantung Army take toward  
20 this commission -- toward the coming of this commission?

21 A It was the attitude of the Kwantung Army to  
22 have the Lytton Commission see and understand the true  
23 situation with respect to Japan's military actions in  
24 Manchuria since the outbreak of the Incident as well as  
25 the various independence movements without hiding anything.

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1 so that they will be fully -- the Lytton Commission  
2 could fully familiarize itself with all the details  
3 with respect to military and political developments.

4 Q However, it is said that entry into Manchuria  
5 of the Chinese assistant Dr. Wellington Ku was refused.  
6 Do you know anything about that?

7 A Yes, I do.

8 Q Please tell us, the Tribunal, the circumstances  
9 about the matter.

10 A As far as the Kwantung Army as well as Japanese  
11 diplomatic organs of that time was concerned they were  
12 not opposed to Wellington Ku's coming into Manchuria.  
13 However, as far as the Manchurian side was concerned,  
14 particularly those of the Foreign Department of the  
15 Manchukuo Government and the leaders of Manchukuo, they  
16 were very much -- they very much opposed and disfavored  
17 the idea of his coming into Manchuria.

18 Q Do you mean to say that the Kwantung Army was  
19 not connected at all with it?

20 A Yes, the Kwantung Army had to concern itself  
21 as far as protection was concerned, protection of the  
22 person of Wellington Ku, if he should come.

23 Q Since the Inquiry Commission entered Manchuria  
24 did you have any occasion to talk with the members of  
25 that Commission?

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1           A    Yes, I was in attendance at the time conver-  
2           sations were held between General HONJO and Lord Lytton.  
3           There were also conferences and consultations between  
4           members of the Inquiry Commission and staff officers of  
5           the Kwantung Army.

6           Q    Mr. Witness, you just testified that all necessary  
7           materials were provided to the Lytton Commission. Are  
8           you correct in that statement -- in making that state-  
9           ment?

10          THE MONITOR: Slight correction: Not all  
11          necessary materials but all materials, all data.

12          A    Yes, I mean to say that the true situation was  
13          fully explained to the Lytton Commission.

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1 Q Does that mean that you also told the  
2 Lytton Commission everything that you have told --  
3 things such as you have testified in this Tribunal?

4 Did you tell to that commission all you  
5 have said in this Tribunal?

6 A Yes. My recollection was that everything  
7 was explained to the Lytton Commission except what  
8 General HONJO had disclosed to his staff officers  
9 with regard to purely internal matters or military  
10 matters.

11 Q Were you ever requested by that commission  
12 to make a testimony?

13 A No.

14 Q Well, then, did you ever talk with that com-  
15 mission outside of making the testimony?

16 A No.

17 Q You said a minute ago, witness, that you  
18 were in attendance when General HONJO had a talk with  
19 Lord Lytton, is that correct?

20 A Definitely.

21 Q Please state what you heard General HONJO  
22 say in that interview, briefly.

23 A Then I will state my recollections of that  
24 time as briefly as I possibly can. First of all,  
25 General HONJO spoke -- told Lord Lytton that the



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1 actions of the Kwantung Army was based purely on the  
2 right of self defense. The second point which Gen-  
3 eral HONJO spoke about was the special character of  
4 Manchuria. Third, General HONJO explained roughly  
5 the circumstances and events leading up to the in-  
6 dependence of Manchukuo. Fourthly, General HONJO  
7 explained that, in order to settle once and for all  
8 the various problems and issues in Manchuria, there  
9 was no way out except on the basis of the independence  
10 of that area through collaboration between Japan and  
11 and China, as well as harmony and understanding be-  
12 tween the Japanese and the Chinese peoples, in an  
13 effort to establish a long range relationship of  
14 mutual collaboration and assistance.

15 THE MONITOR: Slight correction.

16 A (Repeated) With the establishment of a  
17 new state in Manchukuo, it was General HONJO's sub-  
18 mission that in the final analysis the only way to  
19 settle the outstanding various problems in that area  
20 was by having Japan and Manchukuo hold hands together  
21 in bringing about a mutual settlement of these issues  
22 and, furthermore, to settle the longstanding issues  
23 between Japan and China by mutual collaboration,  
24 cooperation and harmonious relations between Japan  
25 and China.

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1 THE INTERPRETER: It appears that a complete  
2 interpretation or retranslation is necessary:

3 A (Repeated) Together with the establishment  
4 of a new state in Manchukuo, it was General HONJO's  
5 submission that, in the final analysis, the only  
6 way to settle the various long-standing issues be-  
7 tween the two countries was through mutual collabora-  
8 tion, cooperation and mutual aid between Japan and  
9 Manchukuo.

10 Furthermore, General HONJO spoke very candid-  
11 ly to Lord Lytton, stating that, in the light of the  
12 situation in East Asia, Japan would have to take  
13 charge of the national defense of Manchukuo, and  
14 also, for the time being at least, that Japan should  
15 take charge of the preservation of law and order in  
16 Manchukuo.

17 Q Was that General HONJO's personal opinion,  
18 or was it views of the Japanese Government?

19 A That was the opinion of HONJO, Commander-  
20 in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

21 Q Were any instructions received from Central  
22 Government with respect to that matter?

23 A No.

24 THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will this  
25 witness be?

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1 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I am afraid that it will  
2 take this afternoon, your Honor.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we may insist upon  
4 him giving the rest of his direct examination on  
5 affidavit. It is becoming impossible.

6 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Is that the ruling, your  
7 Honor?

8 THE PRESIDENT: Go on until a quarter of  
9 three, and I will tell you after three what we are  
10 going to do.

11 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

12 Q What position did the Kwantung Army take  
13 towards the vested rights of Japan in Manchuria?

14 A The view entertained by the Kwantung Army  
15 was not only the protection of Japanese interests in  
16 Manchuria but also to acquire the friendly dispo-  
17 sition of the Manchurian people towards Japan,  
18 speaking from an entirely -- considering it from an  
19 entirely moral basis.

20 Q Were any complete measures or steps taken  
21 with respect to that matter?

22 A Will you make your question clear?

23 Q Were any decisions communicated -- decisions  
24 such as decisions taken by the Ministerial Conference  
25 in Japan -- Cabinet Conference in Japan and communi-



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1 cated to the Kwantung Army concerning that matter?

2 A Yes. The gist of the cabinet decision  
3 given at the time of the independence of Manchukuo,  
4 around the middle or the end of March, was trans-  
5 mitted.

6 Q Were the contents of the discussion at the  
7 cabinet meeting -- at that cabinet meeting ever dis-  
8 closed to the meeting of staff officers of the Kwan-  
9 tung Army?

10 A Yes. (Whispering, at 1445, to person next to him)

11 Q Will you explain the gist of it briefly?

12 A It appears that there were three cabinet  
13 meetings. The cabinet decision was divided into  
14 three items.

15 Q I shall not ask you questions concerning the  
16 details of those decisions in order to save time.  
17 However, was the gist of the decision to the effect  
18 that Japan was to control -- to hold actually the  
19 control of Manchukuo?

20 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, I  
21 object to the question on the ground it is grossly  
22 leading.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will have it at  
24 length.

25 Let him answer as you intended originally.

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1 Do not lead him, Mr. OKAMOTO. You are not allowed  
2 to do so. He was about to give three headings. Let  
3 us have all three.

4 Q Will you explain cabinet decisions one by  
5 one?

6 A The decision was very long, and I do not  
7 recall every word and every phrase.

8 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
9 minutes.

10 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
11 taken until 1500, after which the proceed-  
12 ings were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

4 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continuing):

5 Q Mr. Witness, do you know that there was a  
6 cabinet change in Japan in about May, 1932?

7 A I do.

8 Q Who formed the new cabinet?

9 A The SAITO Cabinet.

10 Q Who was Foreign Minister in the SAITO Cabinet?

11 A Count Uchida KOSAI.

12 Q Did the cabinet change in Japan result in a  
13 change of Japan's policy towards Manchuria?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Please state briefly what you know or heard  
16 about it.

17 A Compared to the preceding cabinet, the new  
18 cabinet's policy vis-a-vis Manchukuo became more  
19 positive, and as a matter of fact, this new cabinet  
20 recognized the State of Manchukuo.

21 Q Later, did any change in the composition of  
22 the Kwantung Army occur later?

23 A In August, Commanding General HONJO was  
24 transferred and succeeded by another commanding general.

25 Q What happened to the chief of staff?

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1 A The former chief of staff, MIYAKE, had  
2 already been transferred to another post in April of  
3 that year, and his successor as chief of staff,  
4 HASHIMOTO, had already been changed and transferred to  
5 another post in August.

6 Q What happened to you, Mr. Witness?

7 A I also was transferred.

8 Q Do you know what General HONJO did after  
9 having been transferred from Manchuria and coming  
10 up to Tokyo?

11 A In the first part of September 1932, General  
12 HONJO went to the palace and reported to His Majesty,  
13 the Emperor, on military matters.

14 Q Did you accompany the General when he went  
15 to the palace to report to the throne?

16 A Yes, I accompanied him at the time he went to  
17 the palace.

18 Q Do you know what was said by the Emperor to  
19 General HONJO on that occasion?

20 A I heard of the words of His Majesty at the  
21 time of a discussion following the formal report on  
22 the military matters.

23 Q Please state briefly what you heard.

24 A Roughly, three remarks were made to General  
25 HONJO and other general officers and staff officers

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1 who had returned from Manchuria. First was an inquiry  
2 from the throne as to the situation in north Manchuria  
3 as the result of floods in that area. With respect  
4 to this, the actual situation was reported to the  
5 Emperor. The second inquiry from the throne was  
6 whether or not the people of Manchuria were rejoicing  
7 over the fact that a new state had been created.  
8 The reply to the inquiry from the throne was that the  
9 Manchurian leaders as a whole were very much ardent  
10 in their efforts on behalf of the new state, but that  
11 a vast majority of the people had not awakened to  
12 modern government and politics and, therefore, it was  
13 difficult to entertain any prospects; however, that  
14 it was a fact in Manchuria that the people in general  
15 entertained high hopes because the conditions in  
16 Manchuria had improved over the time when the war  
17 lords were in control of Manchuria and, therefore,  
18 Manchuria, that is, the prospects of Manchuria lied in  
19 the future of that state.

20 The third inquiry from the throne was whether  
21 the Liu Tiao-kow Incident was a result of a plot on  
22 the part of the Kwantung Army in view of rumors to  
23 that effect. Commanding General HONJO, in response  
24 to that inquiry, emphatically stated that the Kwantung  
25 Army and that he, himself, as commander-in-chief, had



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1 not engaged in any plotting whatsoever.

2 Q Later on, what post or positions did you  
3 assume?

4 A I was staff officer to the 18th Division at  
5 Kurume.

6 Q What was your next post then?

7 A Member of the General Staff Office.

8 Q In what year was it?

9 A That was August 1933.

10 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Your Honor, I now find I  
11 missed some points I should have asked continuing the  
12 question which I put to the witness before the recess.

13 Q Before the recess, I was asking you about  
14 the cabinet decision taken in March 1932, and you  
15 have not finished answering that question. Would you  
16 continue to answer?

17 THE PRESIDENT: Didn't he say he was not  
18 familiar with it?

19 Q Did you, as a staff officer of the Kwantung  
20 Army, learn anything of this cabinet decision?

21 A As I have said before, I have forgotten the  
22 details of the contents of the decision, but I do  
23 remember that the decision was composed of three  
24 items, the first of which was measures to be con-  
25 sidered by Japan with the formation of a new state

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1 in Manchuria. Second, Japan's external relations.  
2 The last point was with respect to the settlement of  
3 various detailed matters, such as with respect to  
4 Japanese property and interests; that is, the settle-  
5 ment of debts and obligations.



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1 Q Did that cabinet decision also include matters  
2 relating to the military control by the Kwantung Army  
3 of Manchukuo?

4 A I do not think that there were any words  
5 to the effect of the Kwantung Army's military control  
6 of Manchuria, but there was something -- I do recall  
7 that the decision included matters pertaining to  
8 national defense and the maintenance of law and order  
9 in Manchuria.

10 THE MONITOR: And the Kwantung Army's atti-  
11 tude toward it, or what the attitude should be.

12 Q What did the cabinet's instructions say?

13 A This was not an instruction. The cabinet  
14 decision was sent to the Kwantung Army's headquarters  
15 as a matter of reference.

16 Q Did the Kwantung Army take any actions on  
17 the basis of this decision -- did the Kwantung Army  
18 act on the basis of this decision?

19 A There were no special measures taken except  
20 the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria which  
21 the Kwantung Army had been doing previously.

22 Q Then, returning to my previous question,  
23 you testified that in 1933 you became a member of the  
24 general staff. What post did you assume there? What  
25 were your duties there?

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1       A    As a member of the Fourth Section of the  
2 2d Division of the general staff office my duties  
3 included the assembling of intelligence and the formu-  
4 lation of publicity plans, and as an officer concur-  
5 rently holding a post in the 5th Section of the 2d  
6 Division I was an assistant in connection with Man-  
churian affairs.

7       Q    What were the relations which existed between  
8 Japan and China at the time of the summer of 1933  
9 with respect to the Manchurian problem?

10       A    Around about June of 1933 the Tangku Truce  
11 was concluded between North China and the Manchurian  
12 side, and in July the so-called Dairen Conference  
13 was held in Dairen with representatives from Japan,  
14 Manchuria and North China. As a result of this con-  
15 ference the military strife between North China and  
16 Manchuria was, at least for the time being, brought to  
17 a close, and it was decided that other outstanding  
18 problems hereafter be settled through amicable processes,  
19 and efforts were made wherein old time enemies shall  
20 become friends.

21       Q    Do you know anything about the fact that a  
22 monarchy was established in Manchuria?  
23

24       A    Yes.

25       Q    Please relate what you know about it, what

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1 you became familiar with in your official capacity.

2 A Yes. I am familiar with the atmosphere and  
3 conditions of the time because I was an assistant on  
4 Manchurian relations at the general staff office.

5 Q Did the Japanese side favor or disfavor the  
6 monarchy system in Manchuria?

7 A There was opposition in one section, but  
8 most of the people were in favor of the monarchical  
9 system -- were not opposed, the majority were not  
10 opposed to the monarchy.

11 Q Who expressed opinions opposing it?

12 A There were military men, the public in gen-  
13 eral, and a number of statesmen, and political circles --  
14 there were voices opposing the monarchy from various  
15 circles including military men, private circles as  
16 well as political circles.

17 Q What attitude did the general staff itself  
18 assume?

19 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are not concerned.  
20 Whether there was a desire for independence may or  
21 may not be in issue, but the particular form of govern-  
22 ment is not in issue, whether it be a monarchy or  
23 something like one, or a republic, is not in issue.

24 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I change to another question.

25 Q Were you later transferred to the War Ministry?



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1           A    Yes, in December 1934.

2           Q    What were your duties then?

3           A    I was chief of the Manchurian section of the  
4   Military Affairs Bureau.

5           Q    What were the relations which existed between  
6   Japan and China at that time, particularly in regard  
7   to the Manchurian problem?

8           A    As a result, following the Dairen Conference,  
9   various problems such as the postal problem, customs,  
10   telegraph, and the permission of respective newspaper  
11   men to enter their countries, these were amicably  
12   settled between 1935 and 1936, and, therefore, at that  
13   time there were no particular problems with regard to  
14   Manchuria existing between Japan and China.

15                I should like to make a slight correction  
16   with regard to dates: There was no outstanding prob-  
17   lems in particular up to the spring of 1935.

18           Q    Do you mean by that that there arose some  
19   outstanding issue in the spring of 1935?

20           A    In North China there was an incident involving  
21   the Peace Preservation Corps in the vicinity of  
22   Yu-tien, and dispute involving Yu Hsueh-chun.

23           Q    Mr. Witness, do you know that later on the  
24   Japanese Government abolished extra-territoriality  
25   in Manchuria?

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1 A Yes, I do.

2 Q What attitude or position did the War Min-  
3 istry as a whole take towards it?

4 A I think it was about February 1935 when the  
5 War Ministry proposed to the Foreign Ministry that a  
6 committee be created in the Foreign Office with  
7 regard to the relinquishment of extra-territoriality  
8 in Manchuria.

9 Q Did Japan regard working at that time?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Please explain.

12 A The relinquishment of extra-territoriality was the last  
13 part of the relinquishment of privileges and was carried out  
14 with respect to the administration of military matters,  
15 administration with respect to customs, and administra-  
16 tion with respect to educational matters.

17 Q Are you familiar with any incident which  
18 occurred on the 25th of February, 1936?

19 A Yes.

20 Q What were your duties then, Mr. Witness?

21 A I was chief of the Manchurian Section, General  
22 Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry.



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1 Q When was the abolishment of the extra-  
2 territoriality put into effect or carried out?

3 A The cabinet decision on the relinquishment  
4 of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo was taken in  
5 August, 1935 and the first part of it was carried out  
6 in June, 1937 and the final carrying out of the de-  
7 cision to relinquish extraterritoriality took place  
8 in December, 1937 -- The cabinet decision was taken  
9 in June, 1935; the first part of the decision was  
10 carried into effect in June, 1936 and the final re-  
11 linquishment was completed in December, 1937.

12 Q Did Japan reserve anything at that time?

13 A Yes.

14 Q Please explain it.

15 A The reservations were made when the last  
16 part of the relinquishment decision was carried out  
17 with respect to the administration of military matters,  
18 administration with respect to shrines, and administra-  
19 tion with respect to educational matters.

20 Q Are you familiar with the incident which  
21 occurred on the 26th of February, 1936?

22 A Yes.

23 Q What were your duties then, Mr. Witness?

24 A I was chief of the Manchurian Section, General  
25 Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry.

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1 Q Were you connected directly or personally  
2 with that incident -- have you had any direct exper-  
3 ience with that incident?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Please explain it briefly.

6 A On the morning of the 26th of February, as  
7 soon as I learned of the outbreak of the incident,  
8 I went to the official residence of the War Ministry  
9 in connection with suppressing tkis uprising.

10 Q What happened then?

11 A After crossing three security lines estab-  
12 lished by the rebel army, rebel troops, I finally  
13 reached the official residence of the War Minister.  
14 There I said, I told these soldiers that they should  
15 not engage in such an uprising and while prevailing  
16 upon them to abandon their activities I requested to  
17 be permitted to see the War Minister. While engaged  
18 in a conversation with the Vice-Minister of War  
19 FURUSHO one of the rebel troops shot at me -- that is,  
20 one of the leaders of the rebel troops shot at me.  
21 The shot lodged on my left side -- left temple -- and  
22 after the rebel leader shot at me he drew out his  
23 sword and started to attack me.

24 Q Please avoid going into details and explain  
25 briefly.

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1           A    I was taken to the hospital after I had  
2               exhorted these soldiers, declaring that the Japanese  
3               soldiers should not engage in any action without the  
4               order of His Majesty, the Emperor.

5           Q    Were you transferred from the War Ministry  
6               to the Kwantung Army later on -- were you ever trans-  
7               ferred?

8           A    Yes.

9           Q    When was it?

10          A    That was in March, 1939.

11          Q    Did you serve in the Kwantung Army in the  
12               year 1937? Haven't you ever served in the Kwantung  
13               Army in the year 1937?

14          A    I was mistaken. That was in March 1937.

15          Q    What were your duties then?

16          A    At first I was handling Manchurian questions  
17               and in December became chief of the 4th section.

18          Q    Had the China Incident already started then?

19          A    No, it hadn't broken out at the time I  
20               arrived at my new post there.

21          Q    Since the China affair broke out in July 1937  
22               what effect did Manchuria receive from that incident?

23          A    It had become a very great obstacle on the  
24               construction and development of the State of Manchukuo.

25          Q    Please explain; elaborate briefly on the matter



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1 which you think became one of the main obstacles  
2 for the development of Manchukuo.

3 A Manchukuo was only five years old at that  
4 time after its founding, and it was in the midst of  
5 a reform of the administration, both of the central  
6 government and the various provincial governments, and  
7 it was also in the midst of the five-year industrial  
8 plan.

9 Q Mr. Witness, do you know anything about the  
10 five-year industrial plan?

11 A Yes.

12 Q When that plan was formulated how much  
13 consideration was taken about the Soviet Union?

14 THE MONITOR: How much of it was directed  
15 towards the Soviet Union, or how much of Soviet Union  
16 was taken into consideration in that plan?

17 A Because of the successive Soviet five-year  
18 plans Manchuria felt greatly menaced and felt the  
19 necessity of building up its strength in order to  
20 meet the situation.

21 Q Do you mean to say that some concrete consid-  
22 eration was given with respect to the problem of  
23 Soviet Russia?

24 A Rather I should say that it was very small  
25 in its scale and the primary emphasis was placed when



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1 the plan was formulated on the development of  
2 Manchuria economically and in developing and  
3 strengthening the industrial basis of Manchuria.

4 Q Please explain a little more fully about  
5 the effect of the outbreak of the China Incident  
6 on this plan.

7 A This plan was based upon a budget of no  
8 more than 2,004,000,000 yuan and as a result of the  
9 outbreak of the China Incident funds and various  
10 necessary materials became no longer available to  
11 carry out the plan. Especially at Japan's request  
12 this plan was expanded but as far as the contents  
13 of the plan was concerned, the benefit did not accrue  
14 to Manchuria whatsoever because the plan was directed  
15 toward assisting the prosecution of the China Incident  
16 rather than for the development of Manchuria itself  
17 and for this reason the people of Manchuria themselves  
18 felt that they were carrying an unnecessary load with  
19 regard to this plan; and, furthermore, it became dif-  
20 ficult to solicit foreign capital into the development  
21 of Manchuria.  
22  
23  
24  
25

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1 Q Mr. Witness, you said that you were  
2 chief of the fourth section of the Kwantung Army.  
3 Now, what were the relations between this section  
4 and the State of Manchukuo?

5 A As a result of the final relinquishment  
6 of extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo in December  
7 1937 and because of a culmination of Japan's assis-  
8 tance in securing the independence of Manchukuo, the  
9 Kwantung Army organization was revised, and the  
10 fourth section became an extremely small section,  
11 its personnel including me and about nine other  
12 men, and we were no more than a business organiza-  
13 tion, business organ established and maintained for  
14 the purpose of liaison work with the Manchurian  
15 side.

16 Q You testified awhile ago that the Manchurian  
17 five-year plan was modified due to the outbreak of  
18 the China Incident. Now does ~~not~~ that mean that the  
19 fourth section interfered, that the modification  
20 resulted due to the interference by the fourth  
21 section of which you are a member?

22 A The Manchukuo people expressed willingness  
23 to cooperate with Japan only to a certain extent,  
24 but the fourth section had nothing to do with it.

25 THE MONITOR: Slight correction. The

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1 Manchurian side, to a very small extent, offered  
2 to cooperate with Japan. However, most of the  
3 modification in this five-year plan came from  
4 Japan's demand in order to make it possible for  
5 her to prosecute her China Incident. Therefore,  
6 the fourth section had nothing to do with this.

7 Q Through what channels were the Japanese  
8 demands communicated; that is, such Japanese  
9 demands communicated?

10 A In Japan proper the decision, first of  
11 all, is taken at the Manchurian Affairs Board.  
12 This is transmitted by the Minister of War to the  
13 Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, and the fourth  
14 section transmits this to the General Affairs  
15 Board of the Government of Manchukuo.

16 Q Then that means that the duties for the  
17 fourth section were only to relay demands coming  
18 from the Japanese side?

19 THE MONITOR: Correction. "Only" is  
20 omitted. Duties of the fourth section were to  
21 transmit the demand from the Japanese side?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Did the Kwantung Army itself ever make  
24 any requests to the State of Manchukuo?

25 A Yes.



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Q Please give a concrete example of it.

A As far as the Kwantung Army is concerned, it did not issue any orders. It merely suggested or expressed a desire or persuaded through its Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff of the Director General or President of the General Affairs Board.

Q Was any measures taken with regard to the stationing of Japanese troops at the time of the relinquishment of the extraterritoriality?

A Yes.

Q What was it?

A Various problems occurred as a result of the relinquishment of extraterritoriality in connection with the fact that the State of Manchukuo was independent and in connection with the fact that even in spite of that Japan was stationing troops in that State. Because of that peculiar situation the Kwantung Army had the Foreign Office investigate into possible cases wherein a foreign country stationed its troops in an independent nation, and as a result it was decided that special consideration be given so that the State of Manchukuo would be respected.

Q Please give a few, a number of concrete



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1 examples.

2 A One example is that in case a Manchurian  
3 civilian committed any acts contrary to law against  
4 the Kwantung Army his trial and punishment and any  
5 measures with respect thereto will be done by the  
6 Manchurian civilian government instead of by courts  
7 martial; and also, to state another example, in  
8 case the Japanese Army required certain material  
9 such procurement orders would be made in accordance  
10 with Manchukuo laws. In other words, to put it  
11 briefly, it was that Japan would, by submitting  
12 as much as possible to the laws of the State of  
13 Manchukuo, relinquish the exercise of any privileges  
14 which the army enjoyed by not exercising the right  
15 of extraterritoriality, which an army would enjoy  
16 under international law. In respect of that,  
17 official documents were exchanged between the  
18 Japanese Ambassador Plenipotentiary and the Com-  
19 mander in Chief of the Kwantung Army with the Prime  
20 Minister of the Manchukuo Government.

21 THE PRESIDENT: That will do for the time  
22 being.

23 Who is dealing with the question of the  
24 recess on behalf of the defense?

25 The Tribunal is prepared to grant a recess

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1 of seven days from the end of this witness' evi-  
2 dence on conditions as follows: That future  
3 witnesses for the defense will give evidence on  
4 affidavit; and that there will be no further  
5 application for recess until June.

6 MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, as to the  
7 witnesses, does that apply to witnesses other  
8 than Japanese?

9 THE PRESIDENT: It applies to all  
10 witnesses because of the need for simultaneous  
11 translation, and then to give the Court an  
12 opportunity to see what evidence they think should  
13 be heard, subject to argument later in court if  
14 necessary.

15 MR. BROOKS: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. OKAMOTO is not through with this  
17 witness, and I think that after a general discussion  
18 of defense counsel we may want to make some observa-  
19 tions in the morning, if your Honor please.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until  
21 half-past nine tomorrow morning.

22 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-  
23 ment was taken until Tuesday, 25 March 1947,  
24 at 0930.)  
25

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